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Abstract 
Legal enforcement of bans on goods can reduce the size of the black market but lead to 
greater violence by increasing revenue in the illicit market.  However, the link between 
enforcement and violence is not as simple as is suggested by the textbook model, even for a 
competitive market.  Nevertheless, under plausible assumptions more enforcement on 
trafficking in the illicit good leads to more violence. 
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1. Introduction 
The textbook model of markets for illicit drugs (as in Frank and Bernanke (2004), for 
example) predicts that stronger enforcement raises prices, revenue, and violence.  The clear 
prediction depends on inelastic demand, the assumed competitiveness of the market, and 
enforcement that targets suppliers only.  Models of noncompetitive black markets or markets in 
disequilibrium, on the other hand, find that the link between enforcement and violence can take 
other forms (Caulkins et al., 2003; Caulkins and Reuter, 2010; Rasmussen et al., 1993). This note 
shows that even in a competitive market in equilibrium, enforcement against trafficking in the 
illicit good can lead to less violence as long as it also includes buyers. Nevertheless, under 
plausible assumptions for illicit drug markets, enforcement will lead to more violence.   
2. The Model 
Consider a competitive market for a banned good. While in principle the market may be 
for any illicit good, demand for the good is assumed to be inelastic as in the markets for 
addictive substances. Effort expended in enforcement against trafficking in the good is proxied 
with a continuous variable,    . The other assumptions and notation follow. 
Supply 
The quantity supplied in the absence of enforcement is   , a function of the net price sellers 
receive   . Function    derives as usual from marginal production and distribution costs.  We 
assume    is a differentiable function with   
   , and denote the supply elasticity with 
     
 (  )     (  )   ⁄ . Enforcement of the ban raises the effective marginal cost of doing 
business by a fraction  ( ). Following Reuter and Kleiman (1986), these additional costs 
include the monetization of the non-monetary perceived risks of arrest, sanction, fine, and 
incarceration, as well as any supply-disruptive activity following from enforcement, such as 
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product seizure. We assume that  ( )    and     ⁄   . Marginal production costs are 
  (  )(   ) with a ban. Price   will refer to the monetary price exchanging hands in the 
market, excluding any risk adjustments. Defining   (   )  , the quantity supplied under 
enforcement is thus:1  
  (   )    ( ( ) ). (1) 
The properties of   imply that  ( )   ,  ( )    and      ⁄   .  
Demand 
The illicit quantity demanded under a ban,   , is a downward-sloping, differentiable 
function of the effective price consumers must pay,   . Demand elasticity is 
      
 (  )     (  )⁄ , and presumed to be inelastic:       .  If enforcement targets 
buyers, then the perceived inclusive expenditure on the product rises by multiple  ( ). This “risk 
tax” on buyers acts like a psychic expenditure tax of rate    . We assume the risk tax satisfies 
 ( )    and     ⁄   . In this simple model there is only a single variable for enforcement, 
and any differential impact of enforcement on the two sides of the market caused by different 
allocations of enforcement effort is captured implicitly by the elasticities of the functions   and 
 . The quantity demanded at black market price  , accounting for buyer risk from enforcement, 
is: 
  (   )    ( ( ) ). (2) 
Violence 
Since the insights of Goldstein (1985), it is common in models of illicit markets to 
assume that violence V rises with illicit revenue R earned in the market:   ( )   . V includes 
both demand-side crime committed to raise money for purchasing the good and crime 
                                                          
1
 The derivation follows from the fact that the supply function is the inverse of the marginal cost curve of the 
industry. Inversion of     (  )(   ) yields      
  (  [   ( )]) and thus equation (1).  
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perpetrated among suppliers (for example, to establish sales turf). We set aside any direct 
beneficial effect of enforcement effort on violence (    ⁄   ), since (following the textbook 
model) we model enforcement against trafficking and not violence per se.   
3. The Impact of Enforcement on Violence 
Consider how prices, revenue, and violence change as enforcement ramps up. Define 
excess demand as  (   )    (   )    (   ). Then applying the implicit function theorem to 
the equilibrium condition  (   )    gives an expression for how the equilibrium price changes 
with enforcement:2 
  
  
  
    ⁄
    ⁄
  
   
  ⁄     
  ⁄
     
  (3) 
where the elasticities are understood to be evaluated at the effective prices    and   . The 
denominator of (3) is unambiguously positive, and so the sign of the expression depends only on 
the numerator. Thus market price will increase with marginal increases in enforcement if and 
only if 
           (4) 
where    is the elasticity of function   with respect to enforcement. Both sides of inequality (4) 
are positive. The left side captures the demand-side price sensitivity to changes in enforcement, 
while the right side reflects the supply side. Whether the condition is satisfied depends on the 
relative magnitudes involved. This conclusion is in contrast to the simple textbook reasoning that 
more enforcement leads to higher prices by shifting the supply curve up. The price effect of 
increased enforcement is ambiguous in general because if demand is elastic enough or 
                                                          
2
 The derivation uses the facts that   
 (  )  (     )    (  ) and   
 (  )  (     )    (  ). 
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consumers are highly sensitive to enforcement risk, the demand-side effects can cause the market 
price to fall. We analyze various cases below to draw additional insight from the model. 
If the demand curve did not shift, and demand is inelastic as assumed, then knowing the 
direction of the price change also lets us know how revenue and violence change. However, 
when the demand curve shifts downward in response to enforcement, there is a countervailing 
effect on revenue. Equilibrium revenue can be written as    ̂  ( ̂  ), where  ̂ is the 
equilibrium price given enforcement level  . The total impact on violence of a marginal change 
in enforcement level is 
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(5) 
We have     ⁄    by assumption. The first term in the brackets is the price effect. When 
enforcement rises, the price changes in accord with equation (3), which has a marginal impact on 
revenue. The term in parentheses in the price effect is the usual marginal revenue term for an 
increase in price. For the assumed inelastic demand, this term is always positive: 
   ̂
   
  
  (    )   .  
Thus, when the demand curve sits still, revenue change has the same sign as   ̂   ⁄ . This 
is usually assumed in the textbook analysis of illicit markets and violence.3  However, the second 
term in equation (5), the direct impact of enforcement on the demand curve (the “demand-
shifting” effect, or DSE), is negative. From equation (2), we have: 
                                                          
3
 See, e.g., Caulkins et al. (2006): “A standard argument in the analysis of drug markets is that when enforcement 
drives up the price of the drug, it also increases the revenues flowing to drug dealers if demand is inelastic.” 
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     ̂
   
  
        ⁄   . (6) 
This term is the offsetting effect on revenue of the demand curve shifting down in response to 
enforcement risk. Thus, even when the sign on the price change is clear from inequality (5), the 
total effect on revenue and violence is unclear. If the DSE is large enough in magnitude, there is 
less revenue in response to a price increase even with inelastic demand. However, the DSE is 
smaller in magnitude when demand is more inelastic and when the effective price paid by 
consumers is less sensitive to enforcement.  In the conclusion we discuss why these assumptions 
are likely to apply to illicit drug markets. Therefore we expect that the DSE will attenuate but not 
reverse the primary impact on revenue of the price change. We refer to this as “assumption DSE” 
below in the various types of markets now considered.  
 Case 1: No direct enforcement on consumers 
If enforcement is focused entirely on suppliers and consumers are left alone, then     , 
condition (4) is satisfied, and the price rises with enforcement effort. With no countervailing 
DSE in equation (5), there will be greater violence with stronger enforcement. This is the 
textbook analysis. 
Case 2: The long run in a constant-cost industry 
In the long run in a competitive constant-cost industry the supply curve is horizontal. 
With infinite   , inequality (4) is satisfied and greater enforcement of a ban leads to higher 
prices. Under assumption DSE there will be more revenue and therefore more violence. 
Case 3: Completely inelastic demand 
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If there is no responsiveness to price at all on the demand side, perhaps because all but 
the hardest-core addicts have left the market,4 then since     , inequality (4) is satisfied and 
the price rises with more enforcement. Furthermore, from equation (6) there is no DSE, so 
violence also rises. 
Case 4: The general case 
Rearranging terms, condition (4) for the price change can be expressed as: 
  
  
  
  
  
. (7) 
The price will rise with more enforcement in any market in which demand is less elastic than 
supply and more enforcement is targeted toward the supply side (as measured by the impacts on 
risk-adjusted prices given by the elasticity ratios on the right side). Under assumption DSE, 
violence also rises in such markets. Note that small    and    make conditions (6) and (7) both 
easier to satisfy. 
4. Conclusions 
When a good is banned, enforcement aimed at supporting the ban indirectly affects 
violence occasioned by the market.  Enforcement shifts the supply and demand curves, which 
change price, revenue, and violence. In contrast to the textbook model with supply-side 
enforcement only, when buyers are targeted as well, two additional nuances arise in the 
relationship between enforcement and revenue. First, the price increase is attenuated—or even 
reversed—by the increased risk borne by consumers. Second, the downward shift in demand 
decreases revenue.  Thus, the link between enforcement and violence depends on more than the 
                                                          
4
 The argument assumes that users wish to consume a fixed number of hits per day.  On the other hand, a referee 
pointed out that if hard-core addicts spend virtually all their disposable income on drugs, then their demand would 
be very price-elastic. 
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elasticity of demand.  However, under plausible circumstances pertaining to markets for many 
illicit goods—supply more elastic than demand and enforcement targeted more toward 
suppliers—an increase in enforcement has the unintended consequence of more violence.  
It is interesting to consider applying the model to menthol cigarettes, which the United 
States Food and Drug Administration is considering banning.5  Numerous studies have shown 
that demand for cigarettes (in general, or for menthol cigarettes in particular) is highly inelastic 
(Chaloupka and Warner, 2000; Tauras et al., 2010). If enforcement of a ban follows the pattern 
set by other illicit drug markets, enforcement will fall primarily on suppliers.  Under these 
conditions, the model shows that enforcement raises prices, the demand-shifting effect on 
revenue is small, revenue rises, and there is more violence. The result does not imply that the 
level of violence would be as large as that associated with other illicit drugs; clearly the violence 
function may differ by good, geography, and other factors.  Nevertheless, minimizing total harm 
from menthol cigarettes means minimizing the sum of social harms from consumption of the 
banned good and the additional harms inadvertently caused by enforcement. Policymaking 
should therefore consider the indirect costs of enforcement when calculating the costs and 
benefits of a ban. 
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